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Abstract 
As cyberattacks are on the rise, enterprises must find a way to secure and monitor its critical 
IT assets in order to minimize any impact upon successful attacks. Critical Infrastructures 
are not only reduced to the Government and Public Sector; any kind of running business has 
some kind of IT infrastructure that is critical to the development of its daily operations. 
The present thesis delivers the design of a secure network architecture to monitor a critical 
infrastructure. It features basic perimeter security consisting of high-availability firewalls, a 
DMZ to properly isolate the internal network, a central location to store logs from selected 
hosts, and a Security Operations Centre based on a SIEM software (Splunk), making real-
time monitoring possible via informational dashboards. 
Last of all, an alert scheme is implemented: an e-mail is sent out from Splunk should a critical 
service go down in the Critical Infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
As cyberattacks are on the rise, companies’ have an urgent need to stay one step 
ahead, and keep up with effective early detection and incident response in order to minimize 
a possible impact on their networks. Budget destined to financing said protection is not 
always as substantial as required; while common attacks on infrastructures—such as 
ransomwares and DDoS—may render the whole system useless, ultimately affecting revenue 
in the best-case scenario. 
Furthermore, Critical Infrastructures are not limited to Governments and Public 
Industries, most running businesses have elements within its IT architecture that are crucial 
not only for their continuity, but also for the well-being of their population and/or customers. 
Every single IT system generates thousands of logs per minute, a gold mine of 
information that has to be treated wisely in order to have the massive stream working in our 
favour. 
Having an appropriate structure to harness machine data, coupled with the adequate 
tools to interpret it, has the potential to both determine the infrastructure’s operational 
health in real time; and its security posture within its regulatory policy. 
The present project is defined within the current trend of big data analysis oriented 
towards security events, and its aim is to make basic perimeter security and monitoring 
affordable to virtually any company—regardless of their sector—by means of open-source 
tools and reasonably priced licensing. 
 
1.1. Objectives 
a. Design and provision of a network architecture with the intent of monitoring the 
performance of a Critical Infrastructure. 
b. Alert generation and early reporting on possible attacks against the Critical 
Infrastructure. 
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1.2. Scope 
The design and implementation of a security architecture to monitor a Critical 
Infrastructure, comprising High-Availability Firewalls, a DMZ, a Central Logging Server, 
Management Thin Clients, as well as the network planning regarding VLANS and 
segmentation, the inclusion of an event collection and correlation system (SIEM) in order to 
be used as a Security Operations Centre (SOC), the simulation of a Critical infrastructure by 
means of PLC emulation software, and finally, early detection of a possible attack against said 
Critical Infrastructure, in the form of an e-mail alert containing information regarding the 
incident. 
Moreover, when monitoring performance, the following parameters are taken into 
account: RAM, CPU, and Running Services. Security monitoring will be based on logging 
events over any attempt to access configuration folders that simulate the Critical 
Infrastructure (C:/EasyPLC), and critical processes’ uptime. 
Lastly, the entire architecture will be simulated in a virtual environment using Oracle 
VirtualBox.
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1.3. Project Timeline 
The present project requires a research stage so as to evaluate and define the appropriate technologies, to define the architecture, sketch 
the network planning, and deploy a proof of concept. The technological composition stage follows the research, where the selected instances are 
installed, along with the initial configuration and network provision.  
The development stage is crucial—and represents the core of the project—as work towards the objectives completion is performed. 
Dashboards, event correlation, alert reporting, the core functions of the architecture are configured during this stage. Ultimately, the quality stage 
ensures the system’s fine-tuning for optimal performance. 
 
Figure 1. Task list with Gantt chart as extracted from Microsoft Project planning 
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CHAPTER 2 
Background 
2.1. Virtualized Environment 
The process of virtualization pertains to the creation–by software means—of a 
virtual version of a technological resource (such as an operating system, a hardware 
appliance, or even a shared network resource). The available hardware resources are pooled 
in an abstraction layer accommodated between the host (physical machine) and the guest 
(virtual machine). [16] 
Said abstraction layer manages the host's four main resources (CPU, Memory, 
Network Adapters, and Peripherals) so as to dynamically allocate them among the guests, 
enabling the cohabitation of multiple virtual machines on the same physical computer. 
There are three main types of virtualization: 
 
a. Para-virtualization:  
Guest programs are executed within their own isolated environments; 
however, since a hardware environment is not completely simulated, said programs 
need to be modified in order to run successfully. 
b. Partial Virtualization: 
Most hardware environment instances are simulated, though not all, 
requiring some guest programs to be modified in order to run in the virtualized 
environment. 
c. Full Virtualization: 
The virtual environment is simulated in its entirety [15], enabling an 
unmodified guest operating system to run with all its native configuration. 
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2.2. Firewall Usage 
Provides means to control incoming and outgoing network traffic based on a 
predefined set of rules, it can be either hardware based or software based. Its target is to 
establish a barrier between a trusted internal network and an external network (which is 
untrusted by default). [13] 
There are different types of firewalls, according to their placement within the network and 
where exactly is the communication directed: 
 
Packet filters: Operating on a low level TCP/IP layer, they function by preventing packets 
from passing through the firewall unless they match an established rule. It may be stateless 
or stateful, depending on their capability to maintain context about active sessions to speed 
packet processing (where active session information includes IP address, TCP/UDP ports, 
connection lifetime, handshakes, etc.) 
Application layer firewall: Working on the application level of the OSI model, it may intercept 
all type of communication generated by—or towards—a specific application. It analyses all 
traffic so as to identify malicious content and drop the packets without acknowledgement to 
the sender) 
Proxy servers: mainly for internal usage, it acts as a gateway by relaying input packets in the 
manner of an application, while blocking other requests. It is widely used to filter user access 
by content to ensure the conformity of a policy. 
 
2.3. Dual-Firewall DMZ 
Term derived from “demilitarized zone”, it constitutes a perimeter subnetwork 
(either physical or logical) that contains external-facing services accessing a largely 
untrusted network (e.g. The Internet) [14] 
Its purpose is to add an extra layer of security to an organization LAN (Local Area 
Network), since no external element has direct access to the internal hosts. It is devised as a 
neutral zone, belonging neither to the external network nor the internal network. 
The most secure approach is to use two firewalls for this purpose. The first firewall is 
external-facing or “front-end” and allows the traffic from the Internet to the DMZ. A second 
firewall is internal-facing or “back-end” and only allows traffic from the DMZ to the internal 
network. 
Any service that requires external access is provided by the front-end firewall and 
then forwarded on to the LAN through the back-end firewall. 
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Figure 2. Dual Firewall DMZ architecture 
(Retrieved from http://i.stack.imgur.com/JjaRg.png) 
 
2.4. Critical Infrastructure 
A critical infrastructure represents an asset or system which is essential for the 
maintenance of vital societal functions. It constitutes a wide range of facilities, depending on 
the governments’ security directives; however, a common denominator among the USA NIPP 
and the EPCIP [1] are:  
c. Supply Plants (Gas, Electricity, Water) 
d. Oil Production (and subsequent distribution chain) 
e. Telecommunications 
f. Public Health (hospitals, ambulances) 
g. Transportation System. 
h. Financial Services (stock exchange, banks) 
i. Security Services (military, police) 
Any threat against said structures is regarded as a hazard in security, national economic 
security, public health. [2] 
 
2.4.1. Critical Infrastructures within a business 
 
A critical infrastructure is also an element within a business’ IT infrastructure that is 
crucial to ensure daily operation continuity. Consequently, its protection should not be 
specifically oriented towards governments and municipalities; but accessible at an 
Enterprise level as well. 
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2.5. Log Files 
 
Virtually every process within a system automatically generates a log instance, where 
new lines are appended at the end of the file correlating to the most recent events. These are 
critical to have an insight of what the system is actually doing. Since logs are written on local 
disks, when the system grows in number of hosts, log management may become a dire task, 
overcomplicating the troubleshooting of a particular error. The pragmatic approach is to 
setup a centralized logging server in order to aggregate all log information in a common 
location. 
2.5.1. Syslog implementations 
There are native daemons that allow the processing and forwarding of log messages 
in UNIX systems, such as rsyslog and syslog-ng. Depending on the scalability requirements 
other solutions may be implemented, offering distributed log collectors designed for high-
volume and high throughput event collection (e.g. Splunk, Logstash) [3] 
2.5.2. Event Log Monitoring and Event Correlation 
The main input for security and performance analysis is via event messages 
generated by network assets. A comprehensive record can be maintained, resulting very 
useful for later audit procedures. 
However, it is of the utmost importance to have an appropriate event correlation. 
Only a cross-relation among all events in the system may actually detect an anomaly in the 
network, a potential harmful activity may go undetected should the correlation fail to 
associate the appropriate events. 
A conceptual interpretation procedure where new meaning is assigned to a set of 
events that happen within a predefined time interval [4]. During the event correlation 
process, new events might be inserted into the event stream and original events might be 
removed. 
The following event correlation approaches may be taken: 
a. Rule based, events correlated according to conditions and actions, specifically 
tailored by security analysts. 
b. Codebook based, a specific chain of events interpreted as a main transaction 
events. In order to correlate a stream of events, the codebook interprets vectors 
to its own codebook of main events. 
c. Graph based, the focus shifts to hardware devices, where a relation among these 
is established beforehand. A graph is constructed and then is used to find the root 
cause of a fault event. 
d. Neural network based, the highest known type of detection. Based on neural net 
training to detect anomalies based on a big data learning approach of an event 
stream. 
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2.6. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
Common endpoint for logs and events, network-wide, assisting security analysis, and 
enhancing the possibility to react faster upon any security threat [5]. Its main functions are:  
Data aggregation: receiving data from various sources. Centralization of information. 
Correlation: Linking events together, finding common attributes in order to turn data into 
useful information. 
Alerting: Correlated events provide a deeper insight into what needs to be investigated with 
the utmost importance. 
Dashboards: Aiding in real-time monitoring, enhances the assistance in recognising patterns 
and anomalies-that otherwise would be very hard to find out via log entries. 
2.6.1. Choosing a SIEM 
The basic requirement is that of a tool to help manage and analyse log files on 
premise, centralized, that is able to support a wide range of log formats, and handle the 
majority of Operating Systems without overcomplicating its initial setup and configuration. 
Preferably open-source and counting with a free licensing alternative. 
Not only does Splunk counts with all of the above, it also offers wide options to 
organize and display the information by means of charts, dashboards and tables, it also 
counts with the possibility to include plugins in order to process most types of log formats 
and technologies. 
 
Figure 3. Splunk Integrations 
(Retrieved from http://blog.takipi.com/log-management-tools-face-off-splunk-vs-logstash-vs-sumo-logic/) 
 
There is little difference between its free, open-source version, and its paid version. 
Mostly differentiating in technical support and indexing capacity. The user is able to perform 
a full deployment with no limit to the number of hosts, searches, alerts, correlations or 
reports, having the only constraint of a daily indexing volume of 500 MB, which is enough for 
a controlled environment at a reduced scale. Furthermore, there are different licence types 
according to the needs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Project Development 
3.1. Architecture Overview 
The highlighting feature of the design is its High-Availability cluster, provided by a 
stand-by redundancy both in the front-end and internal Firewalls. The synchronization is 
routed towards a separate VLAN, and should the failover be performed, the stand-by backup 
Firewall will receive the signal over said VLAN and immediately take over the routing and 
firewalling tasks. 
Moreover, a DMZ has been implemented in order to minimize to the minimum degree 
the external exposure of the critical network. All outbound traffic towards the Internet 
generated by the internal network should expressly be routed towards the DMZ and then 
towards the exterior, making a two-step rule through the aforementioned Firewalls. 
Lastly, any attack from the exterior will be focused solely on a single interface on the 
front-end Firewall, shielding the internal network and the Critical Infrastructure. 
 
3.1.1. Subnets Definition 
There are no DHCP servers in the architecture, mainly to prevent queries from 
unknown hosts to associate to the network as well as a possible spoofing. Consequently, a 
static routing has been established, ensuring the most secure approach from the networking 
perspective. 
All subnets have been defined within the Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) 
RFC1918 “Address Allocation for Private Internets”, corresponding to 24-bit block addresses 
(single class A networks, beginning in 10.0.0.0/8), expressly reserved by the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) for private networking. 
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The network is consisted of 7 subnets: 
10.0.0.0/24: Internal network – Internal FW management, Syslog Server 
10.0.15.0/24: Internal network – Internal FW high-availability synchronization 
10.0.25.0/24: Internal network – SIEM traffic 
10.0.35.0./24: Internal network – Critical Infrastructure 
10.0.100.0/24: Internal network – External FW management  
10.0.115.0/24: Internal network – External FW high-availability synchronization 
10.0.125.0/24: DMZ – Services gateways 
 
 
Figure 4. Top level view of the network architecture 
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3.1.2. Resources 
 
The main Operation System choice is based on open-source availability and clarity in 
development documentation. Debian and Ubuntu have been chosen for the ThinClient, 
Syslog Server, and SIEM implementations; whereas FreeBSD has been chosen for the firewall 
deployment (by default, due to pfSense platform). The distribution is as follows: 
 
MACHINE OS INT IP VIRTUAL IP GATEWAY USERS 
Front Primary 
Firewall 
pfSense 
2.2.6 x64 
WAN Default - - 
admin 
LAN  10.0.100.1  10.0.100.15 - 
SYNC 10.0.115.1  10.0.115.15   -  
DMZ 10.0.125.11 10.0.125.15 - 
Front 
Backup 
Firewall 
pfSense 
2.2.6 x64 
WAN Default - - 
admin 
LAN  10.0.100.2   10.0.100.15   -  
SYNC 10.0.115.2 10.0.115.15 - 
DMZ 10.0.125.12 10.0.125.15 - 
Front 
ThinClient 
Ubuntu 
15.10 x64 
enp0s3 10.0.100.20 - 10.0.100.15 fwmgmt 
Internal 
Primary 
Firewall 
pfSense 
2.2.6 x64 
DMZ 10.0.125.1 10.0.125.5 - 
admin 
LAN  10.0.0.1   10.0.0.15   -  
SYNC 10.0.15.1 10.0.15.15 - 
SIEM 10.0.25.1 10.0.25.15 - 
INFR 10.0.35.1 10.0.35.15 - 
Backup 
Firewall 
pfSense 
2.2.6 x64 
DMZ 10.0.125.2  10.0.125.5  - 
admin 
LAN  10.0.0.2   10.0.0.15   -  
SYNC 10.0.15.2 10.0.15.15 - 
SIEM 10.0.25.2 10.0.25.15 - 
INFR 10.0.35.2 10.0.35.15 - 
Internal 
ThinClient 
Debian 
8.3.0 x64 
eth0 10.0.0.20 - 10.0.0.15 fwmgmt 
Syslog Server 
Debian 
8.3.0 x64 
eth0 10.0.0.10 - 10.0.15.15 logadmin 
Splunk 
Ubuntu 
15.10 x64 
enp0s3 10.0.25.10 - 10.0.25.15 splunkadmin 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Windows 7 
Ethernet 
1 
10.0.35.10 - 10.0.35.15 infradmin 
Table 1. Active resources 
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3.1.3. Oracle Virtual Box 
 
 
Figure 5. Architecture deployment in Oracle Virtual Box Manager 
 
A virtualized environment has been chosen in order to simulate the system, and test-
drive the theoretical design. Oracle Virtual Box provides a reliable and scalable platform to 
manage Virtual Machines, along with its own Network Manager to host local connections 
within the environment.  
For a full description of all network interface configuration, including Internal 
Networks, Drivers, and number of adapters by Virtual Machine, appendix (section 1) may be 
consulted. 
3.1.4. Virtual Switch Configuration 
Given that all routing among Virtual Machines is static, it would be necessary to 
incorporate a Virtualized Switch to handle all VLAN traffic. However, Oracle Virtual Box 
reckons said need, and provides internal networking switching via its Internal Network 
option when configuring virtualized hardware adapters in a Virtual Machine. It suffices to 
specify the correct VLAN name, the rest is handled seamlessly, provided that all subnet 
segmentation is done properly within the guest OS. 
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Figure 6. Oracle Virtual Box Available Internal Networks 
 
VLAN mapping onto Oracle Virtual Box, achieved via the aforementioned Internal 
Network option, has been implemented as follows:  
10.0.0.0/24: int_management 
10.0.15.0/24: int_sync 
10.0.25.0/24: int_siem 
10.0.35.0./24: int_infrastructure 
10.0.100.0/24: front_management 
10.0.115.0/24: front_sync 
10.0.125.0/24: front_dmz 
The visual interface constraints the maximum number of available adapters to four; 
however, more may be added via command line using the VBoxManage.exe tool [6], as can be 
seen in the following figure: 
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Figure 7. Extra interface configuration via VBoxManage.exe tool 
 
Looking at figure 7, the step-by step configuration is interpreted as follows: 
a. Modify Virtual Machine INTBCKP, enable Network Interface Card #5 (NIC5) and 
attach to an internal network. 
b. NIC5’s internal network is “int_infrastructure” (correlating to 10.0.35.0/24 in the 
architecture design) 
c. Set the promiscuous mode on NIC5 to “Allow VMs” (hides all host traffic from this 
VM but allows the VM to see traffic from/to other VMs) so, the only networking 
that can be done is within the design. 
d. Emulate the Ethernet Am79C970A PCnet-PCI II onto NIC5 (selected as the 
standard network hardware for all the elements in the design, for its driver is 
supported in most OS distributions by default) 
e. Set the cable connection to on (may be turned off in the event of a hot-plug 
troubleshoot) 
3.1.5. Thin Clients 
Clients with reduced functionality, their only purpose is to serve as an administrative 
tool to manage firewalls. They’re completely isolated from the Internet, and their only 
interface is attached to the LAN network of their respective firewall. 
The static routing has been configured as follows: 
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Figure 8. Network configuration for Internal Firewall Client Manager (Debian) 
 
 
Figure 9. Network configuration for External Firewall Client Manager (Ubuntu) 
 
3.1.6. Firewall Installation and Configuration 
PfSense is chosen as a free, well-documented, open-source project running on top of 
a FreeBSD Linux distribution. It serves both as a firewall and routing platform. It offers a 
wide range of features and a packaging system, enabling its further expansion without 
adding unnecessary bloatware and its inherent security vulnerabilities. 
The installation is carried out with an ISO image over a FreeBSD instance in Oracle 
Virtual Box, said ISO can be found in the official website and is free to download.  
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Figure 10. Initial pfSense configuration setup 
 
The above figure shows the opening display after completing the wizard for the 
initial configuration (setting time zone, hostname, domain, interface recognition and IP 
assignment). Further setup must be done using the webConfigurator, accessible only via the 
LAN IP (10.0.100.1) from a terminal’s browser within the same network segment (in this 
case, an external thin client with the IP 10.0.100.10) 
 
 
Figure 11. WebConfigurator’s login prompt for the External Primary Firewall 
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3.1.6.1. Firewall Interfaces 
One of the main reasons to choose pfSense over other open-source firewall projects 
is its scalability. PfSense is able to accommodate as many interfaces as the network requires, 
along with its rulesets and services. These may be configured using the webConfigurator UI 
or the command line. [7] 
Four firewalls are required for the implementation, two for the external network, and 
two for the internal network (each network has its primary firewall and a backup one in 
order to enable high availability). The DMZ separates both networks. 
The necessary interfaces are allocated via the command line following the design in 
figure 4, assigning as many interfaces as network segments attached to each Firewall, and 
naming them accordingly. Thus, rendering the following configuration: 
 
 
Figure 12. Interface configuration for External Primary Firewall 
 
Figure 13. Interface configuration for Internal Primary Firewall. 
 
Similarly, the interface configuration on the backup firewalls is equivalent: 
 
 
Figure 14. Interface configuration for External Backup Firewall. 
 
Figure 15. Interface configuration for Internal Backup Firewall. 
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3.1.6.2. pfSense User Interface 
 
Once all the interfaces have been assigned with their respective IP addresses, further 
configuration may take place. By logging in into the webConfigurator on the Primary Internal 
Firewall (IP address: 10.0.0.1), the Home Dashboard is displayed. 
This dashboard may be customized to the client’s need, but it generally displays the 
Firewall’s hostname, domain, its version, CPU, system’s time, DNS servers, and interfaces’ 
information and status (up/down). 
 
 
Figure 16. Internal Primary Firewall Home Dashboard 
 
There’s also a top toolbar with the following options: 
a. System (General configuration, high availability and user management) 
b. Interfaces (Interfaces setup, renaming, IP addresses, etc) 
c. Firewall (Aliases, NAT, rules configuration and Virtual IP setup) 
d. Services (configuration of NTP, DHCP, SNMP, WoLAN, among others) 
e. VPN (VPN access configuration) 
f. Status (event information, from failovers to system logs, FW logs, traffics graphs, 
etc) 
g. Diagnostics (tools to troubleshoot connectivity issues, firewall states, tables, 
packet capture, and its own command prompt ) 
h. Gold (licensing and membership) 
i. Help (wide range of documentation, including community forums, e-books and 
Wikis) 
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Figure 17. pfSense Top Toolbar 
 
3.1.6.3. Shared Virtual Addresses 
In order to set up the High-Availability cluster, a common gateway must be placed on 
each network segment, so as to avoid gateway duplication (or misdirection) once clients join 
the network. This can be achieved by creating a Virtual IP (figure 18) that can be used by the 
Primary and Backup Firewall interchangeably, regardless of their default interface IP 
address.  
CARP (Common Address Redundancy Protocol) handles the Firewall Cluster’s high-
availability in pfSense, so a Virtual IP of said type must be added on each interface of the 
Primary Firewall. 
 
 
Figure 18. CARP-type Virtual IP creation  
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Figure 19. Final Virtual IP configuration for common gateway usage 
 
3.1.6.4. Failover Implementation 
According to pfSense documentation [7], pfsync transfers state insertion, update, and 
deletion messages between firewalls. Each firewall sends these messages out via multicast 
on a specified interface. Following the documentation advise, a dedicated interface for said 
handling has been defined (SYNC) due to the amount of synchronization traffic. 
 
 
Figure 20. High-Availability configuration is accessed through the main toolbar 
 
The failover configuration is stated in the Primary (master) Firewall, said 
configuration will be mirrored in the specified Backup Firewall by means of pfsync protocol. 
As shown in the figure below, after the interface choice, the peer IP address is 
entered. It is important that both firewalls have mirrored management settings so as to act 
as a single cluster. 
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Figure 21. PFSYNC protocol handles sync communication between the firewalls 
 
Following the sync communication setup, it is time to choose what states shall be 
synchronized by selecting the specific settings: 
 
 
Figure 22. Synchronization settings between the Primary and Backup Firewall 
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Furthermore, the current state of the redundancy setting may be checked at all times 
following the main toolbar: Status > CARP (failover) 
 
 
 
Figure 23. CARP status on the Internal Firewall Cluster 
 
3.1.6.5. Gateway Services 
A set of services have been put in place in order to let the system run smoothly. A key 
component, for example, is the system time. All elements across the network should be 
synchronized so as to achieve the required precision when logging an event. The very 
implementation of a SIEM is purposeless if the recorded events are off time. No early 
response can be carried out for events arriving with irregular timestamps. 
In order to synchronize all timestamps, a central NTP (Network Time Protocol) 
service has been conceived. The External Firewall Cluster gets its time from the closest 
Network Time Foundation’s pool server [8] and listens on the DMZ interface for any NTP 
queries. 
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Figure 24. NTP service configuration on the External Firewall Cluster 
 
 
 
Figure 25. NTP server configuration on SIEM system 
 
 Moreover, the Internal Firewall Cluster listens on all its interfaces and solves internal 
NTP queries after getting the time from the External Firewall Cluster by querying the DMZ 
gateway. Internal clients, such as the SIEM and Syslog Server query directly their respective 
gateways (Internal Firewall Cluster’s Virtual IP) for time synchronization. 
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Figure 26. NTP service configuration on the Internal Firewall Cluster 
 
 Following the same basis, a DNS Resolver and DNS Forwarder have been 
implemented. The Internal Firewall Cluster receives DNS queries from the internal network 
(listening on all its interfaces) and forwards said queries towards the External Firewall 
Cluster via the DMZ Upstream Gateway (DMZUPSTRM). 
 
 
Figure 27. DNS Forwarder enablement on the Internal Firewall Cluster 
 
Moreover, the External Firewall Cluster listens on its own interfaces, and solves all 
queries by using Google’s servers. 
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Figure 28. DNS Resolver configuration on the External Firewall Cluster. 
 
 
Figure 29. The DNS Server on the Internal Firewall Cluster is the External Firewall Cluster 
 
 
Figure 30. The DNS Server on the External Firewall Cluster is Google. 
Lastly, the DMZUPSTRM has been envisioned to route traffic from the internal 
network through the DMZ towards the external network, and even to the Internet (if allowed 
by the firewall ruleset) 
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Gateways on the Internal Firewall Cluster: DMZ (10.0.125.0/24) 
 
 
Figure 31. Gateways on the External Firewall Cluster: DMZ (10.0.125.0/24) and Internet (WAN DHCP) 
 
3.1.6.6. Firewall Rulesets 
 In order to control what traffic is allowed to enter an interface on the firewall, a 
ruleset must be established. Firewall rules on interfaces process traffic in the inbound 
direction, following a top-down manner and stopping on the first match. If no user-defined 
rule is matched the traffic in question is denied by default; however, the default rule on the 
LAN interface prevents a possible lockout by allowing the LAN subnet to any destination (to 
be used for management purposes). Only traffic explicitly allowed in the interface ruleset 
shall be passed. 
 
 
Figure 32. Internal Firewall Cluster Rules: LAN interface 
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They are managed via the main top toolbar in Firewall > Rules. There is a tab for 
each defined interface. Moreover, system aliases can be defined to simplify the ruleset 
definition and make it more user-friendly. By navigating to Firewall > Aliases, not only can 
client IP addresses be defined, but also groups, ports, and even URLs. 
 
 
Figure 33. Internal Firewall Cluster Aliases 
 
3.1.6.7. Log Forwarding 
Each firewall has been set up to forward all of its logs towards the Central Logging Server, as 
illustrated in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 34. Remote logging configuration for the External Firewall Cluster 
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3.1.7. Centralized Logging Server 
 
In order to maintain an organized stream of security events, a central logging server 
has been implemented. All firewall security logs, as well as any system events—including 
failover and synchronization—are being routed towards a central location for convenient 
storage and forwarding towards the SIEM.  
 
3.1.7.1. Network Configuration 
 
The Syslog Server belongs in the Internal Network, more specifically in the 
10.0.0.0/24 subnet, its gateway is the Internal Firewall Cluster LAN interface (10.0.0.15), 
and its DNS nameserver is the Internal Firewall Cluster’s DMZ gateway. By default, its traffic 
is routed through its aforementioned Firewall gateway. 
 
 
Figure 35. Central Logging Server Network configuration 
 
 
Figure 36. Central Logging Server’s Routing Table 
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3.1.7.2. Log Reception 
 
Log reception has been provided by Linux’s native service rsyslog (Rocket-Fast 
System for Log Processing), enabling listener modules on TCP and UDP ports 514. 
 
 
Figure 37. TCP/UDP log reception modules on rsyslog.conf 
 
 
Figure 38. Logging template on rsyslog.conf 
 
Logs are organized and stored in the central server using a template 
definition, as seen in figure 39. The template is named “security” and registers every 
log by filing them under the directory /var/log/security by hostname and program 
name.  
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Figure 39. Inherent rsyslog logging rules 
 
Moreover, the configuration rules inherent to rsyslog capture all standard linux log 
files and stores them by facility (figure 40), resulting in an orderly tree that reinforces an 
efficient SIEM event lookup. In the figure below, the Internal Firewall Cluster’s logs are 
shown: ntp synchronizations, logins, ruleset matchs, shutdowns, among other system events. 
 
 
Figure 40. Central Logging Server Directory tree, Internal Firewall Cluster Logs 
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3.1.7.3. Log Forwarding and Folder Monitor 
 
Finally, once all the system’s logs are properly received and stored, it is time to 
forward them on to the SIEM. For said purpose, an instance of Splunk has been used: “Splunk 
Universal Forwarder”.  
This instance is based on a daemon named splunkd that monitors specified folders on 
the local disk and forwards them on to an specified host in outputs.conf (as shown in the 
figure below, in this case, on to the SIEM over TCP port 9997) 
 
 
Figure 41. Print of the outputs.conf contents 
 
  
Figure 42. List of monitored folders, towards the end: /var/log/security 
. 
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Critical Infrastructure 
 
The main objective of the project is to be able to monitor the system performance of 
an infrastructure that is deemed critical by EU directives. The physical performance (e.g. 
Main function of the Infrastructure) and physical security (Access Controls, Procedures, etc.) 
are considered out of scope of the project, so as to focus on a software level functionality. 
 
3.1.7.4. Network Configuration 
 
 
Figure 43. Critical Infrastructure’s network configuration 
 
The Critical Infrastructure belongs in the Internal Network, more specifically in the 
10.0.35.0/24 subnet, its gateway is the Internal Firewall Cluster INFRA interface 
(10.0.35.15), as well as its DNS nameserver. By default, its traffic is routed through its 
aforementioned Firewall gateway. 
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Figure 44. Critical Infrastructure’s routing table and DNS query 
3.1.7.5. EasyPLC 
 
In order to emulate a Critical Infrastructure within the EU security mainframe, a PLC 
program running on Windows has been put in place for the purpose of simulating a water 
supply facility. EasyPLC has been the software of choice, following the open-source focus and 
its convenient library. Furthermore, a demo sequence has been modified and customized for 
said purpose, accommodating two tanks (a digital one and an analogue one) along with a 
control panel to simulate the entire physical environment. 
 
 
Figure 45. EasyPLC Program Editor: Main sequence for water tank filling 
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Figure 46. Water Supply Tank simulation on EasyPLC. HMI System is running. 
 
Moreover, the crucial aspect of the project is to ensure the real-time monitoring of 
said simulation, regardless of its physical function. The critical processes that must be 
reported on are: 
a. VirtualPLC.exe *32: in charge of the PLC virtualization, a program is loaded onto 
said virtual PLC and then set in run mode. 
b. HMI_System.exe *32: “Human Interface Module”, responsible of presenting the 
visual information of the system to the operational personnel. 
 
Figure 47. Critical Infrastructure Processes. VirtualPLC is running. 
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The objective is to set up an alarm in the Security Operation Centre should any of the 
aforementioned processes go down; however, Windows registers an abundant amount of 
security logs for every single system event.  
 
3.1.7.6. Processing and Forwarding Windows Security Events 
 
Forwarding the entirety of Windows events towards the SIEM presents a burden on 
the network in traffic volume, while also diminishing the SIEM’s index capacity (500MB per 
day for the free version). 
In order to avoid noise and unessential event logging in the network, there must be a 
pre-processing and log filtering before the forwarding. Two widely available, open-source 
tools are used for said purpose, each with different intent: 
 
a. SNARE 
 
Acronym for System Intrusion Analysis and Reporting Environment, collects Windows 
audit log data from a host system and pushes said data to a server in order to facilitate a 
centralized log analysis and reporting. It is considered as the “de facto standard for Windows 
event retrieval” and complies with the majority of information security guidelines related to 
eventlog collection and system auditing. [9] 
It functions as an agent on the host system with a web-based interface for configuration, 
reachable on https://localhost:6161. 
 
 
Figure 48. SNARE Remote Control Configuration  
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Several parameters may be configured both in the Network Configuration and Objectives 
Configuration tabs, more specifically and relevant to the project: 
 
 
Figure 49. SNARE Network configuration 
 
The Destination Server Address is targeted towards the SIEM over UDP port 6160. 
SNARE is given the appropriate permission to automatically set the audit configuration for 
the objects that are to be monitored. 
The output format is set to Syslog, so as to keep compatibility with UNIX systems, and the 
Priority (available only if Syslog is selected) is set to “Emergency”, overriding the criticality 
at the reception. 
Said configuration has been tailored to reach the main objective for which SNARE 
implementation within the project has been devised: monitoring folder access. 
 37  
 
 
Figure 50. SNARE Objectives Configuration 
 
For the event filtering, the following guidelines were configured via the Objectives 
Configuration tab, as shown in the figure 50: 
Exclude Event IDs: 
4656 (A handle to an object was requested) 
4688 (A new process has been created) 
4690 (An attempt was made to duplicate a handle to an object) 
Exclude Processes matching any instance of “Splunk” (such as Splunkd) 
Include User Group Management Events 
Include Reboot Events 
Include File Events that match the directory C:\EasyPLC\* 
 
 
Figure 51. Log in Lastest Events tab: C:\EasyPLC\HMILib was accessed  
 
Lastly, all filtered events may be seen in the Latest Events tab, a very useful tool when 
troubleshooting log collection within the SIEM. 
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b. Splunk Heavy-Forwarder 
 
In order to complement SNARE’s share of log forwarding, an instance of Splunk has been 
installed onto the Critical Infrastructure, specifically to cover the rest of the objective: to 
monitor the system performance. 
Said instance is configured to monitor exclusively performance counter parameters, and 
forward a certain set of field extractions on to the SIEM. This is commonly known as a Heavy 
Forwarder, since it performs a previous processing before data forwarding. It provides a 
stream of cooked data. 
 
 
Figure 52. Splunk Enterprise login page 
 
The Local Performance Monitoring may be found by navigating through the main 
toolbar in Data Settings > Data Inputs > Local Performance Monitoring. Three performance 
counters have been defined: CriticalInfraMemory, CriticalInfraProcessor, and 
CriticalInfraProcess, in order to monitor the percentage of committed memory bytes in use, 
percentage of processor time, and monitor both VirtualPLC and HMI_System, respectively. 
The polling interval may be adjusted as required, in seconds, so as to accommodate 
the real-time monitoring feature of the proposed main objective. 
 
 
Figure 53. Local Performance counter definition 
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Analoguely, a full list of running services may be obtained via Settings > Data Inputs > 
Local Windows Host Monitoring, and selecting “services” in the event types to register. 
 
 
Figure 54. Adding logging for running services 
 
Upon restart, Splunk Heavy-Forwarder will begin logging performance events at the 
selected polling interval rate, as shown in the figure below. The field extractions (value, 
counter, host, object, source, etc.) are performed seamlessly, as the sourcetype is assigned to 
“Perfmon” and natively supported by the system. 
 
 
Figure 55. Sample of event logging for memory and processor counters 
 
Finally, to forward the processed events towards the SIEM, the configuration is 
reached via the main toolbar in Settings > Forwarding and Receiving > Configure 
Forwarding. As illustrated in the figure below, forwarding has been enabled on to 10.0.25.10 
(SIEM IP address) over TCP port 9997. 
 
 
Figure 56. Forward Data configuration on the Critical Infrastructure
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3.2. SIEM 
 
3.2.1.  Network Configuration 
 
The SIEM belongs in the Internal Network, more specifically in the 10.0.25.0/24 
subnet; its gateway is the Internal Firewall Cluster SIEM interface (10.0.25.15), as well as its 
DNS nameserver. By default, its traffic is routed through its aforementioned Firewall 
gateway. 
 
 
Figure 57. SIEM static network configuration 
 
3.2.2. Splunk 
 
The package corresponding to the Enterprise Edition was retrieved from Splunk’s 
official website and decompressed onto the root folder. The corresponding scripts and 
libraries are appropriately set in place by default, as shown in figure 58, so no further action 
must be taken apart from running the program for the first time. 
 
 
Figure 58. Splunk installation directory tree and scripts 
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Figure 59 shows the command to run Splunk, it binds several ports on start-up (such 
as TCP 8000 for management), validates indexes, starts the Splunk Server daemon, among 
other preliminary checks. 
 
 
Figure 59. Starting up Splunk Enterprise 
 
Upon start-up completion, a web server is made available on 127.0.0.1 (alternatively, 
localhost, or siem, being the latter its hostname) and TCP port 8000, thus providing the main 
user interface for configuration. Furthermore, the main GUI is loaded, accessible from any 
common web browser (figure 60) 
 
 
Figure 60. Splunk home and Settings tab 
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3.2.3. Getting Data In 
 
In order to index data coming from the Centralized Logging Server and the Critical 
Infrastructure’s Heavy Forwarder, a listener on TCP port 9997 must be configured. This may 
be done by navigating to Settings > Forwarding and Receiving  
 
 
Figure 61. Splunk listening on TCP port 9997 for cooked data 
 
On one hand, the SIEM is able to index events coming from said sources without 
worrying about field extractions or source types, since the data stream has been pre-
processed in the origin. Its task is to identify and index incoming events for further analysis. 
On the other hand, there is still uncooked data that is being forwarded to the SIEM 
(i.e. Snare) that must be indexed in order to ultimately have the complete network event 
stream. For this purpose, a new listener must be configured, as shown in the figure below, in 
Settings > Data Inputs > UDP 
 
 
Figure 62. Splunk Data Inputs 
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Snare is forwarding Windows Security Events targeting UDP port 6160, so a new 
listener is to be created, in order to acknowledge said stream. Additionally, the source 
hostname is overridden so as to match the data coming from the pre-processed events (i.e. 
criticalinfra), along with the source type “windows_snare_syslog”, which provides the 
adequate field extractions to index the data uniformly. 
 
 
Figure 63. Splunk listening on UDP port 6160 intended for Snare logs 
 
Moreover, a host restriction is set in place by accepting exclusively UDP data from the 
Critical Infrastructure, with the aim of making up for the lack of handshake in the UDP 
protocol. 
 
 
Figure 64. Host resquest restriction 
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3.2.4. Search App and Big Data Analysis 
 
The core development of the project, apart from providing the supporting 
architecture to monitor the performance of a Critical Infrastructure, is analysing what is 
going on in the network. Being able to differentiate, group, correlate and manage a massive 
amount of events in order to extract relevant information, and present it to the Security 
Analyst in a convenient and orderly manner. 
 
 
Figure 65. Search App main screen 
 
Once the information stream is being properly indexed by Splunk, the appropriate 
field extraction is performed (according to the incoming source type), by extracting the 
relevant information from the raw logs and made available for subsequent querying over 
field tags. 
Splunk Search App’s commands provide the required flexibility to handle from the 
most basic functions to the most complex ones. A Splunk search is performed by means of 
commands and arguments that chained together in conjunction with a pipe character “|” 
results in a filtered event output. 
It supports keywords, quoted phrases, Boolean expressions, wildcards, field names, 
and comparison expressions. Generally, a common query will include a field (from the 
available extracted fields) and an argument or value. When entering several fields, the AND 
operator is implied. For example: 
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Figure 66. Example search query 
 
The query above returns three events from the host “criticalinfra” and source 
“Perfmon:CriticalInfraProcessor” (associated to the % of CPU Committed Bytes) within a 1 
minute window. 
Moreover, subsearches may be performed by means of brackets and the usage of the 
“search” command. For example: 
 
 
Figure 66. Example sub search query 
 
The figure above shows a query for the latest 5 events from the host “criticalinfra” 
having “Perfmon:CriticalInfraProcessor” as their source. 
A table with the full command guide has been annexed in the appendix (section 2) 
with their usage. The most relevant and applicable to the project are: transaction, eval, table, 
and search. 
 
3.2.5. Relevant Events 
 
Once all the information can be located in the SIEM, it is of the utmost importance to 
identify which events are relevant to the actual monitoring, especially for Windows, given 
the high amount of event types generated.  
For instance, for security events generated by attempts to access an object, Windows 
Event ID 4663 [11] is of interest. However, due to the high amount of irrelevant events 
generated by Windows, several of them must also be filtered out (such as Event ID 4656, 
4688, and 4690) 
 
3.2.6. Correlating Events 
 
The key aspect of data analysis is finding a relationship among seemingly unrelated 
events to work out the system analysis and monitoring, whether it is matching time, source, 
object, or even a combination of relevant fields. 
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Splunk supports event correlations using time and geographic locations, transactions, 
sub-searches, field lookups, and joins. However, the main focus will be on the command 
transaction, since it enables event grouping (ideal for the high amount of Windows events) 
when a unique ID identifier is not sufficient to discriminate between events (Windows’ 
Handle and PID are reused) [10] 
The command transaction aggregates events according to specified constraints, it 
functions by analysing the raw data from each event, along with the time and date of the 
earliest member. Additionally, two new fields are generated to help the analysis: duration 
and eventcount. 
 
 
Figure 67. Transaction command usage 
 
Take the query above, for example, and all requests for objects contained in the 
EasyPLC folder. The transaction command is used to group events that have the same 
process as object requester, narrowing down the information from 158 events (the total sum 
of the column eventcount down to just 4 main events. 
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3.2.7. Dashboards 
 
In order to present the relevant information in a visual manner, dashboards have 
been configured so as to aid the security analyst in identifying anomalies in the Critical 
Infrastructure’s performance. Several parameters have been selected for said task: 
 
 Percentage of CPU Utilization 
 
Figure 68. Search query for % of CPU utilization 
 
The above figure illustrates the query to retrieve the counter for the CPU utilization. 
It is described as follows: all events from the Critical Infrastructure are evaluated, more 
specifically, those generated by the performance counter “Perfmon:CriticalInfraProcessor”. 
Afterwards, a timestamp modification is performed in order to keep exclusively the hour in 
24H format, followed by an evaluation with the purpose of rounding the Processor 
percentage to the most significant two decimals. Finally, a table is drafted to visualize the 
formatted time with their respective value. 
The query is then routed onto a panel in the Home Dashboard, as depicted in the 
figure below: 
 
Figure 69. CPU Utilization dashboard. 
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 Percentage of Memory in Use 
 
 
Figure 70. Search query for the % of Memory Utilization 
 
Analogously, for the memory performance counter, a similar query is performed and 
described as follows: gather all events from the Critical Infrastructure generated by the 
Memory performance counter. Create a variable named “Time” in order to store the 
timestamp in 24H format. Similarly, create another variable named “Memory” and store the 
Memory percentage value rounded to the two most significant decimals. Finally, draft a table 
with Time and Memory. 
Next, a Home Dashboard is created with the information from the previous table 
(Time in the X-axis, and Memory in the Y-axis) for its monitoring. 
 
 
Figure 71. Memory in Use dashboard 
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 Access to Configuration Folder 
 
The access to the PLC’s configuration folder is yet another feature to monitor in the 
Critical Infrastructure. This is slightly more complicated, since a number of previous on-site 
Windows configurations must be performed in order to have the required security events. 
First, the Local Security Policy must be accessed, and via Local Policies > Audit Policy 
any success or failure attempt to access a directory must be audited. 
 
 
Figure 72. Audit Directory Service Access 
 
Then, the target folder’s advanced properties (in this case, C:\EasyPLC\) allow a special 
security configuration. By following Security > Auditing > Add, a new auditing entry may be 
added as seen in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 73. Windows Folder Audit configuration 
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The folder has been configured to generate an audit security event with any of the 
following attempts on its main folder or subfolders: 
a. Traverse folder / execute file 
b. List folder / read data 
c. Create files / write data 
d. Create folders / append data 
e. Delete subfolders and files 
f. Delete 
Furthermore, back in the SIEM, the following search query renders the dashboard to 
monitor the aforementioned accesses. 
 
 
Figure 74. Search query 
 
The search query has the following rationale: gather all Windows 4663 events with 
message “an attempt was made to access an object” that were generated on the folder 
“C:\EasyPLC” and its subfolders, and explicitly not generated by a PLC process. Then, the 
variable Action will host the message “Folder Accessed” instead of the actual system message 
“An attempt was made to access an object.” 
Now, in order to group and consolidate duplicated events onto a single event, the 
transaction command is used to correlate folders accessed at the same time, regardless of its 
Handle ID. Finally, a table is drafted with the most relevant information: timestamp, the 
action, folder accessed, process name, and account name, as represented in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 75. The Home Dashboard for folder access includes a time picker 
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 Running Services 
 
In order to retrieve the service list previously generated in the Critical Infrastructure, 
the following query is performed: 
 
 
Figure 76. Running Services search query 
 
Gather all events generated by the source criticalinfraservices, group them by the same 
time and State (since two lists are generated with the same timestamp: running services, and 
stopped services), then perform a new search for the desired State, and keep only the latest 
result. Lastly, for cosmetic purposes DisplayName is renamed as Service. 
The Home Dashboard shows the latest Running Services list. 
 
 
Figure 77. Services Dashboard 
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 Monitoring Critical Processes 
 
As mentioned previously, the core of the monitoring of the Critical Infrastructure’s 
function can be abstracted to the monitoring of its main processes, namely, HMI_System.exe 
(Human-Machine Interface System) and VirtualPLC.exe (PLC emulation) 
 
 
Figure 78. Query for Critical Processes counter 
 
Gather all performance events generated by CriticalInfraProcess, group them by time 
and its instance (VirtualPLC/HMI_System), and retain the latest result for each instance. 
The variable uptime will hold the latest runtime value, in minutes, without decimals; 
whereas the variable time_diff will have the time difference, in seconds, between the latest’ 
result arrival time and the current time (the search must always be run in a real-time 
window).  
The variable status will be set to “Process UP” should the time difference be less than the 
polling interval plus a 10% safeguard (current polling interval has been set to 90 seconds, as 
shown in figure 53; if the time difference is greater than the polling interval-meaning that no 
performance event has arrived recently, thus assuming there might be a process outage. 
Lastly, the flag mail_alert will be raised should the process status be “Process DOWN”.  
 
 
Figure 79. Processes Runtime Dashboard 
 
Finally, the Home Dashboard for the monitoring of HMI_System.exe and 
VirtualPLC.exe can be seen in the figure above. 
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3.2.8. Alert Generation 
In order to ensure an early incident response alerts can be set up to notify when a 
certain condition has been met. 
 
 
Figure 80. Search query that generates the alert 
 
Splunk searches can be conveniently saved as alerts. The figure above shows a query 
based on the Critical Processes’ home dashboard. The objective is to send an email should 
any of the aforementioned processes exits. An additional line has been added to the original 
query so as to search for raised flags. By going on the upper right-hand corner and selecting 
Save As > Alert, the following window shows up: 
 
 
Figure 81. Alert configuration window 
 
The relevant configuration pertaining the alert is its trigger condition set to Per-Result 
basis, and its type set to Real-time, so the system will be continuously monitoring the 
variable mail_alert. Now, it does not suffice to trigger an alert, an action must be added. 
Splunk offers several options regarding this aspect, including running a script, and 
posting to a specified URL (HTTP POST). The selected option for this project, however, is the 
email notification, as seen in the following figure: 
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Figure 82. Triggered action: send email. 
 
The figure below shows the email format configuration: 
To: recipient’s email. 
Priority: set to Highest, this is reflected upon the email’s receipt. 
Subject: “Splunk Alert: CRITICAL PROCESS DOWN” 
Message: fully customizable, variables regarding the alert generation may be used, 
such as the trigger time in hours, minutes, and seconds. 
Include: a PDF may be included for traceability purposes, as well as the inline result 
of the search query (raw event data related to the process’ last polling) 
 
 
Figure 83. Alert email configuration. 
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In order to actually send out the email, a provider must be set. The implementation of a 
SMTP server was considered; however, it represents an unjustified workload for the actual 
return when there are more viable solutions, such as Gmail. 
An email account was created under the name splunkmanagement@gmail.com, and by 
disabling the two-step sign-in verification it could be automated to serve as Splunk’s default 
Mail Server.  
This is done going to Settings > Server Settings > Email Settings and configuring Gmail’s 
SMTP parameters (URL, port, and encryption protocol), along with the account’s information, 
as shown in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 84. Splunk Mail Server configuration 
 
Evidence of automation can be found by actually login in the management account on 
Gmail, and clicking on the bottom right-hand corner on “Details” to see the history of account 
activity by type, as the following figure illustrates: 
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Figure 85. splunkmanagement@gmail.com SMTP activity extracted directly from Gmail 
 
Lastly, the history of triggered alerts can be consulted directly on the Operations Centre, 
by selecting Activity > Triggered Alerts, and also, by navigating to the specific alert type on 
Settings > Searches, reports, and alerts > Process DOWN. 
 
 
Figure 86. History of triggered alerts by Process DOWN 
 
 
Figure 87. General History of triggered alerts
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
4.1. Real-Time Monitoring via Dashboards 
 
As seen in the figure below, the Critical Infrastructure’s performance can be monitored 
remotely from the Security Operations Centre. Security information such as accesses to the 
PLC configuration folder and Running Windows Services are also displayed. 
 
 
Figure 88. Home Dashboards 
 
Moreover, its critical processes are monitored in real-time, should one of these go 
down an alert is triggered and an email is sent. 
These parameters and views may be personalised according to the client’s needs and 
specifications, however, it could also be offered as a basic display setting, and further on 
expanded in bundle with other security services additions. 
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4.2. Customizable Alert Generation  
 
Any type of information found in the SIEM can be reported externally, the current 
project proposed an alert based on a Critical Infrastructure’s process availability and SMTP 
delivery. However, this may be easily scalable to essentially any security event generated in 
the system (account logins, sudo command executions, firewall rules match or blocked traffic, 
etc.) and a customizable delivery method, such as an immediate HTTP post to a specified 
URL, or a hard copy log in a remote server. 
 
 
Figure 89. Alert email, as received, from the SIEM 
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CHAPTER 5 
Project Budget 
5.1. Open-Source 
 
The open-source focus is centred on the free distribution and development, not only 
does it enhance the financial viability of the project, but it also offers the possibility of 
tailoring said project to the final client’s needs and shape it in the most technologically 
adequate way for further scalability. Tools like pfSense and Splunk are found in the avant-
garde of said focus, providing all of the above plus an optional premium choice, should more 
out-of-the-box functionality—or extended features—be needed.  
 
5.2. Initial Costs 
 
The main cost is derived from the personnel worktime invested in developing the 
project, since the entirety of the tools at hand are open source and readily available with a 
computer and a working Internet connection. 
 
Amount of days dedicated to background training:    19 (152 hours) 
Amount of days dedicated to the technical composition:  12 (96 hours) 
Amount of days dedicated to the development and fine tuning: 22 (176 hours) 
Total amount of hours:   424 
Price per hour:    8.00 € 
Splunk 1GB/day yearly license 1,700 € [12] 
 
Project cost:     5,092.00 € 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions  
6.1. Scope completion 
The Critical Infrastructure’s performance can be monitored by implementing Splunk 
as a SIEM, and ultimately acting as an Operations Centre for a Security Technician. 
Furthermore, the option to fine-tune parameters is flexible enough so as to adjust the project 
specifically to the client’s needs. 
A basic security mainframe has been provided, including high availability firewalls 
with restricting rulesets, a dual-firewall DMZ providing the minimum possible area for attack, 
a central logging server for convenient storage, and a SIEM with an alert scheme to ensure an 
early incident response. 
 
6.2. Recommendations 
This project has been envisioned to provide the backbone of a secure architecture 
oriented towards monitoring Critical Infrastructures; however, it would be ideal to 
complement it with additional security elements. 
Most of these additional solutions may be implemented natively in pfSense (e.g. an 
IPS and IDS via Snort package inclusion). Also, with an adequate investment, even more 
interesting solutions may be achieved, such as a DLP (Data Loss Prevention), NAC (Network 
Access Control) and Antivirus deployment, choosing from flagship security vendors, such as 
McAfee, Kaspersky, FireEye, among others. 
Depending on the client’s needs, Oracle VirtualBox may not fulfil Enterprise 
requirements in terms of scalability, technical support, or internal regulations. Generally, it is 
preferred to rely on licensed solutions like Citrix Xenserver, and benefit from its guaranteed 
24/7 support, wider framework, upgrades, hot-fixes and continuous updates. 
Lastly, the present project may be aimed towards clients with critical monitoring 
needs who are lacking the resources for a proprietary solution, such as small towns wanting 
to ensure their traffic light systems are always running, and farms employing automated 
mechanisms to count their livestock running on a SCADA system. 
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Appendix 
 
 Section 1: VM Network Configuration in VirtualBox: 
 
a. VM according to their network segment and their OS description 
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b. Network configuration for the External Firewall Cluster 
  
  
 
c. Network Configuration for the Internal Firewall Cluster 
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d. Network Configuration for the Management Clients 
  
 
e. Network Configuration for the Central Logging Server 
  
 
f. Network Configuration for the SIEM and Critical Infrastructure 
  
 
